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ATTORNEY REINSTATEMENT STANDARDS: A
PROPOSAL FOR REFORM IN WASHINGTON STATE
Lawyers who have fallen from grace and attempted to redeem themselves
have provoked dramatic statements from both the bench' and the public2 in
Washington State. In recent years, several widely debated cases involving
well known public figures have cast the subject of reinstatement into the
limelight. 3 These cases reveal a number of flaws in the State's current
guidelines. As a result of the decisions made in these cases, the need for a
new approach to this problem has become increasingly urgent.
This Comment reviews the background leading to Washington's present
reinstatement guidelines and analyzes the approach taken by the Washing-
ton Supreme Court in deciding reinstatement petitions. Three recent cases
are discussed to illustrate the problems created by the current approach. 4
This Comment suggests that the court adopt a new approach in deciding
reinstatement cases. The proposed approach establishes uniform disbar-
ment periods for specific offenses and clarifies the qualifications expected
of individual reinstatement applicants. This approach utilizes the catego-
ries of offenses set forth in the proposal drafted by the American Bar
Association (hereinafter ABA) Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 5
The proposed changes are applied to a set of facts drawn from In re
Rosellini,6 a reinstatement case recently decided by the Washington Su-
preme Court.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Attorney Reinstatement Process in Washington
Since 1927, there have been 21 reported reinstatement proceedings in
Washington State involving 18 attorneys. 7 Sixteen of these cases resulted in
1. See, e.g., In re Rosellini, 97 Wn. 2d 373, 382, 646 P.2d 122, 127 (1982) (Dolliver, J. dissent-
ing). Justice Dolliver argues in his dissent that Rosellini should not be disbarred. He states "John
Rosellini, after having committed unpardonable acts, is a person who is of such a character that he is
subject to redemption: He has fallen, but he can be saved."
2. Astonishing decision in Walgren case, Seattle Times, Oct. 19, 1985, at A13, col. 1; Honest
lawyers, speak up!, Seattle Times, Jan. 15, 1985, at A7, col. 3; Walgren gets VIP treatment from the
bar, Seattle Times, Dec. 28, 1984, at A7, col. 1; Walgren case could weaken public's trust of lawyers,
Seattle Times, Aug. 9, 1981, at A14, col. 1.
3. InreRosellini, 108 Wn. 2d350,739 P.2d 658 (1987);InreWalgren, 104 Wn. 2d557,708 P.2d
380 (1985); In re Krogh, 93 Wn. 2d 504, 610 P.2d 1319 (1980).
4. Id.
5. STMNDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCONS (Approved Draft 1986).
6. Rosellini,108 Wn. 2d 350, 739 P.2d 658 (1987).
7. Id.; In re Walgren, 104 Wn. 2d 557, 708 P.2d 380 (1985); In re Bowden, 99 Wn. 2d 684, 663
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rulings favorable to the petitioning attorneys. 8 Of the five attorneys denied
reinstatement, 9 three eventually were reinstated. ' 0
The Washington Supreme Court has the right to determine who may
practice law within Washington State. "1 Attorneys permitted to practice in
Washington must abide by the rules set forth in the Rules of Professional
Conduct 12 and the Rules for Lawyer Discipline. 13 A violation of these rules
subjects an attorney to the State disciplinary process. 14 Disbarment is the
harshest form of discipline imposed under these rules. 15
Currently, an attorney is required to wait a minimum period of three
years after the date of disbarment before filing a petition for reinstatement
with the Washington State Bar Association. 16 After receiving the petition,
P.2d 1349 (1983); In re Batali, 98 Wn. 2d 610, 657 P.2d 775 (1983); In re Egger, 93 Wn. 2d 706, 611
P.2d 1260 (1980); In re Krogh, 93 Wn. 2d 504, 610 P.2d 1319 (1980); In re Johnson, 92 Wn. 2d 349,
597 P.2d 113 (1979); In re Chantry, 84 Wn. 2d 153, 524 P.2d 909 (1974); In re Simmons, 81 Wn. 2d
43, 499 P.2d 874 (1972); In re Eddleman, 79 Wn. 2d 725, 489 P.2d 174 (1971); In re Eddleman, 77
Wn. 2d 42, 459 P.2d 387, (dissenting opinion of Finley, J. at 461 P.2d 9) (1969); In re Seijas, 75 Wn.
2d 956, 454 P.2d 203 (1969); In re Simmons, 71 Wn. 2d 316, 428 P.2d 582 (1967); In re Seijas, 63
Wn. 2d 865, 389 P.2d 652 (1964); In re Durham, 59 Wn. 2d 185, 367 P.2d 126 (1961); In re Shain, 24
Wn. 2d 598, 166 P.2d 843 (1946); In re Lonergan, 23 Wn. 2d 767, 162 P.2d 289 (1945); In re
Greenwood, 22 Wn. 2d 684, 157 P.2d 591 (1945); In re Lillions, 196 Wash. 272, 82 P.2d 571 (1938);
In re Bruener, 178 Wash. 165, 34 P.2d 437 (1934); In re Gowan, 141 Wash. 523, 251 P. 773 (1927).
In comparison, 77 lawyers were disbarred in Washington State between 1965 and 1985. Telephone
conversation with Robert T. Farrell, State bar counsel, Washington State Bar Ass'n (Mar. 12, 1987).
8. Rosellini, 108 Wn. 2d 350, 739 P.2d 658 (1987); Walgren, 104 Wn. 2d 557, 708 P.2d 380;
Bowden, 99 Wn. 2d 684, 663 P.2d 1349; Batali, 98 Wn. 2d 610, 657 P.2d 775; Egger, 93 Wn. 2d
706, 611 P.2d 1260; Krogh, 93 Wn. 2d 504, 610 P.2d 1319; Johnson, 92 Wn. 2d 349, 597 P.2d 113;
Chantry, 84 Wn. 2d 153, 524 P.2d 909; Simmons, 81 Wn. 2d 43, 499 P.2d 874; Eddleman, 79 Wn. 2d
725, 489 P.2d 174; Seiias, 75 Wn. 2d 956, 454 P.2d 203; Shain, 24 Wn. 2d 598, 166 P.2d 843;
Lonergan, 23 Wn. 2d 767, 162 P.2d 289; Greenwood, 22 Wn. 2d 684, 157 P.2d 591; Lillions, 196
Wash. 272, 82 P.2d 571; Bruener, 178 Wash. 165, 34 P.2d 437.
9. Eddleman, 77 Wn. 2d 42, 459 P.2d 387,461 P.2d 9; Simmons, 71 Wn. 2d 316,428 P.2d 582;
Seijas, 63 Wn. 2d 865, 389 P.2d 652; Durham, 59 Wn. 2d 185, 367 P.2d 126; Gowan, 141 Wash. 523,
251 P. 773.
10. Simmons, 81 Wn. 2d 43,499 P.2d 874; Eddleman, 79 Wn. 2d 725,489 P.2d 174; Seijas, 75
Wn. 2d 956, 454 P.2d 203.
11. State ex rel. Schwab v. State Bar Ass'n, 80 Wn. 2d 266, 493 P.2d 1237 (1972).
[T]his court does not share the power of discipline, disbarment, suspension or reinstatement with
either the legislature or the state bar association. The ultimate constitutional power clearly lies
within the sole jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. [Miembership in the State bar association and
authorization to continue in the practice of law coexist under the aegis of one authority, the
Supreme Court.
Id. at 269, 493 P.2d at 1239 (emphasis in original).
12. Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) (1985).
13. Rules for Lawyer Discipline (RLD) (1986).
14. RLD Rule 1.1.
15. RLD Rule 5.1; In re Krogh, 93 Wn. 2d 504, 509, 610 P.2d 1319, 1321 (1980) (Wright, J.,
dissenting).
16. RLD Rule 9. 1(a). If a lawyer's petition for reinstatement is denied by the supreme court the
lawyer only need wait two more years before reapplying. Id. Under a proposed amendment to the
disciplinary rules a petition could not be filed until five years after the date of disbarment. The proposal
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the Washington State Bar Association Board of Governors (hereinafter
"Board") conducts an information gathering process.17 The Board then
makes a recommendation to the supreme court regarding the petitioner's
suitability for reinstatement. A ruling by the Board to reinstate the attorney
must be supported by a showing that the attorney's reinstatement will not
be detrimental to the legal system or the public interest. 18 The petitioner
also must possess the qualifications and fulfill the requirements set forth in
the Admission to Practice Rules. 19 If the Board recommends in favor of
reinstatement, the record and the recommendation are automatically sub-
mitted to the supreme court.20 Unfavorable recommendations are not
forwarded to the supreme court unless the petitioner so requests. The
supreme court then reviews the briefs and hears oral arguments on the
reinstatement. Although the supreme court takes into consideration the
Board's conclusions, the court is not bound by them.21
B. Reinstatement Guidelines Used by the Washington State Supreme
Court: Goals, Criteria, and Application
The Washington Supreme Court has stated that the broad goals of
attorney discipline are protection of the public and the preservation of
public confidence in the legal system.22 The goal of protecting the public
allows the petitioner to reapply two years after an adverse decision of the supreme court, or one year
after an adverse recommendation of the Board of Governors if that recommendation is not submitted to
the supreme court. RLD Rule 9.1(a) (Proposed Rules of Court Jan. 7, 1987).
17. RLD tit. 9. The Board evaluates the petition to determine if an investigation and/or a public
hearing is necessary. If a public hearing is scheduled, the Board invites written statements on the
matter. These statements may be submitted on or before the date of the hearing. Also, the petitioners or
their counsel are allowed to make an oral statement to the Board.
18. RLD Rule 9.6(a).
19. Id., Admission to Practice Rules (1986) require that an applicant fulfill educational require-
ments, pass the bar examination and establish good moral character.
20. RLD Rule 9.6(b).
21. In re Rosellini, 108 Wn. 2d 350, 364,739 P.2d 658,665 (1987) "The recommendations of the
bar association, although given great weight, are advisory only and the ultimate decision lies with the
court." Id.; see also Eddleman, 77 Wn. 2d 42, 43,459 P.2d 387, 388 (1969). The supreme court has
decided five final reinstatement appeals contrary to the Board's recommendation. All five lawyers were
reinstated against the Board's recommendation. Rosellini, 108 Wn. 2d 350,739 P.2d 658; In re Shain,
24 Wn. 2d 598, 166 P.2d 843 (1946); In re Greenwood, 22 Wn. 2d 684, 157 P.2d 591 (1945); In re
Lillions, 196 Wash. 272, 82 P.2d 571 (1938); In re Bruener, 178 Wash. 165, 34 P.2d 437 (1934).
Justice Dolliver of the Washington Supreme Court suggests that the differing decisions may be
attributed to the perspectives of the two bodies. Judges represent the general public. The Board
represents the bar association. In light of these respective responsibilites, the Board's perspective may
be somewhat narrower than the supreme court's perspective. Interview with James Dolliver, Justice of
the Washington Supreme Court, in Olympia, Washington (Mar. 2, 1987).
22. In re Rentel, 107 Wn. 2d 276, 282, 729 P.2d 615,618 (1986) (citing In re Kumbera, 91 Wn. 2d
401,403,588 P.2d 1167, 1169(1979)); In re Rosellin, 97 Wn. 2d 373,378,646 P.2d 122, 125(1982)
(citing In re Zderic, 92 Wn. 2d 777,787, 600 P.2d 1297, 1302 (1979)). This statement is in accord with
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includes the protection of clients23 and the general public 24 from legal and
ethical offenses by attorneys. Preservation of public confidence in the legal
system refers to the public's perception that discipline is adequately and
fairly administered. 25 To achieve these goals, the court considers three
objectives when deciding an application for reinstatement: the interest of
the public, the integrity of the legal system, and fairness to the individual
petitioner.26 The court has held that attorneys should not be readmitted
unless they can show that they are rehabilitated, competent, fit to practice,
and in compliance with all disciplinary orders. 27 Attorneys must meet these
requirements by clear and convincing evidence. 28
The criteria considered by the Washington court in determining an
attorney's eligibility for reinstatement were set forth in In re Eddleman.29
These factors are: (a) the applicant's character, standing, and professional
reputation in the community in which the applicant resided and practiced
prior to disbarment; (b) the ethical standards observed by the applicant in
the practice of law; (c) the nature and character of the charge leading to
disbarment; (d) the sufficiency of the punishment undergone in connection
therewith; (e) the applicant's attitude, conduct, and reformation subsequent
to disbarment; (f) the time that has elapsed since disbarment; (g) the
applicant's current proficiency in the law; and (h) the sincerity, frankness,
and truthfulness of the applicant in presenting and discussing the factors
the American Bar Association's definition of the purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings "to protect
the public and the administration ofjustice from lawyers who have not discharged, will not discharge, or
are unlikely properly to discharge their professional duties to clients, the public, and the legal
profession." STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Rule 1. 1 (Approved Draft 1986).
23. In re Batali, 98 Wn. 2d 610, 657 P.2d 775 (1983) (disbarred for trust fund violations).
24. In reWalgren, 104 Wn. 2d557, 708 P.2d 380(1985) (former majority leader of the Washington
State Senate stipulated to disbarment after being sentenced to jail for his conviction on RICO
violations).
25. Id. at 573, 708 P.2d at 389; In re Rosellini, 97 Wn. 2d 373, 380, 646 P.2d 122, 125 (1982).
26. In re Eddleman, 77 Wn. 2d 42, 43, 459 P.2d 387, 388 (1969) (citing In re Seijas, 63 Wn. 2d
865, 868, 389 P.2d 652,654 (1964)). The consideration regarding fairness to the individual applicant is
difficult to reconcile with the first two considerations and some dispute has arisen over which factor
should carry the most weight. See In re Walgren, 104 Wn. 2d 557, 573, 708 P.2d 380, 389 (1985).
27. In re Johnson, 92 Wn. 2d 349,350,597 P.2d 113, 113 (1979). These requirements are consistent
with those stated in the Rules for Lawyer Discipline:
Reinstatement may be recommended by the Board of Governors only upon an affirmative showing
that the petitioner possesses the qualifications and meets the requirements as set forth in the
Admission to Practice Rules . . . and that . . . reinstatement will not be detrimental to the
integrity and standing of the judicial system or to the administration ofjustice, or be contrary to the
public interest.
RLD Rule 9.6.
28. Johnson, 92 Wn. 2d at 350, 597 P.2d at 113.
29. In re Eddleman, 79 Wn. 2d 42, 44, 459 P.2d 387, 388 (1969). The complete list of factors cited
in Eddleman originally was introduced inln re Seijas, 63 Wn. 2d 865, 868, 389 P.2d 652, 654 (1964).




relating to disbarment and reinstatement. The core group of these factors
was introduced in one of the earliest reinstatement decisions.30 Additional
factors were included as more reinstatement cases were presented to the
court. 31 The court is keeping the door open for future alterations to this set
of factors as they become necessary.32
C. Recent Cases
The supreme court applied the Eddleman factors in three recent cases: In
re Krogh,33 In re Walgren,34 and In re Rosellini.35 The decisions in these
cases elicited vigorous dissents36 and stirred public protest.37 The decisions
were criticized for their inconsistent application of the reinstatement stan-
dards and perceived favoritism toward public figures.
38
In re Krogh39 concerned Egil Krogh, Jr., a government employee who
was disbarred after his conviction for committing a federal crime in
connection with the Watergate scandal. 40 Krogh pleaded guilty to involve-
ment in a burglary committed with the assistance of the office of the
President of the United States. He applied for reinstatement five years after
his disbarment, two years less than the average period of disbarment. 41 In
30. In re Bruener, 178 Wash. 165, 34 P.2d 437 (1934). The factors considered were the applicant's
character and standing in the community prior to disbarment, the attorney's ethical standards in the
practice of law, the nature of the attorney's offense, the attorney's conduct since disbarment and the time
period since disbarment. Id. at 167, 34 P.2d at 438.
31. In re Durham, 59 Wn. 2d 185, 186, 367 P.2d 126, 126 (1961) (present proficiency in the
knowledge of law);In re Lonergan, 23 Wn. 2d767,771,162P.2d289,291(1945) (reform demonstrated
by establishing a new reputation); In re Greenwood, 22 Wn. 2d 684, 686, 157 P.2d 591, 592 (1945)
(importance of sincerity and candor in presenting factors related to disbarment); In re Lillions, 196
Wash. 273, 279, 82 P.2d 571, 574 (1938) (sufficiency of punishment).
32. The Eddleman factors have been employed for several years. However, the supreme court has
not ruled out change if necessary. "If a case comes along where they prove to be inadequate, then we
will make some changes. This is the genius of the common law. The system lays out the principles and
when the principles come face to face with the facts you may have to [modify] the principle." Interview
with James Dolliver, Justice of the Washington Supreme Court, in Olympia, Washington (Mar. 2,
1987).
33. In re Krogh, 93 Wn. 2d 504, 610 P.2d 1319 (1980).
34. In re Walgren, 104 Wn. 2d 557, 708 P.2d 380 (1985).
35. In re Rosellini, 108 Wn. 2d 350, 739 P.2d 658 (1987).
36. Walgren at 574, 708 P.2d at 389 (Goodloe, J., and Durham, J., dissenting); Krogh, 104 Wn. 2d
at 508, 610 P.2d at 1321 (Wright, J., dissenting).
37. See, e.g., articles cited supra note 2.
38. See, e.g., comments quoted infra notes 67-68, 70. The commentary to Rule 1.2 of the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions discusses the importance of demonstrating a lack of
favoritism. "Where the lawyer sanctioned is particularly prominent, a public identification demon-
strates that the system does not play favorites."
39. In re Krogh, 93 Wn. 2d 504, 610 P.2d 1319 (1980).
40. In re Krogh, 85 Wn. 2d 462, 536 P.2d 578 (1975).
41. Prior to the reinstatement decision in Krogh, the average length of disbarment in Washington
727
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granting his petition, 42 the supreme court noted Krogh's satisfactory fulfill-
ment of each of the Eddleman requirements. 43 However, few of the factors
are discussed individually and mitigating circumstances are cited to justify
the decision. 44
In In re Walgren45 the Washington Supreme Court reinstated Gordon L.
Walgren, a former majority leader of the Washington State Senate. 46
Walgren was disbarred for violating federal racketeering laws stemming
from his alleged agreement to receive funds for promoting gambling
legislation in Washington State. His reinstatement came three years after
his disbarment, four years less than the average. At the time the decision
was rendered, Walgren was still on parole. 47 Despite his conviction,
Walgren continues to maintain that he is innocent of all crimes.48
The third case, In re Rosellini,49 involved trust fund violations by a well-
known lawyer. In 1977, John Rosellini received $10,000 for deposit in a
client's trust fund. 50 On fourteen separate occasions during the following
year, Rosellini withdrew funds from the account for his personal use. 51
Rosellini then withdrew money from another client's trust fund to pay off
the first debt. Rosellini compounded his offense by lying to the Bar
Association52 and filing an apparently frivolous lawsuit.53 Following an
was approximately seven and one-half years. In re Bowden, 99 Wn. 2d 684, 663 P.2d 1349 (1983)
(disbarred eight years); In re Batali, 98 Wn. 2d 610,657 P.2d 775 (1983) (same);In re Egger, 93 Wn. 2d
706, 611 P.2d 1260 (1980) (same); In re Johnson, 92 Wn. 2d 349, 597 P.2d 113 (1979) (disbarred 11
years); In re Chantry, 84 Wn. 2d 153, 524 P.2d 909 (1974) (disbarred nine years); In re Simmons, 81
Wn. 2d 43,499 P.2d 874 (1972) (disbarred eight years); In re Eddleman, 79 Wn. 2d 725, 489 P.2d 174
(1971) (disbarred seven years); In re Seijas, 75 Wn. 2d 956,454 P.2d 203 (1969) (disbarred 12 years); In
re Shain, 24 Wn. 2d 598, 166 P.2d 843 (1946) (disbarred seven years); In re Lonergan, 23 Wn. 2d 767,
162 P.2d 289 (1945) (reinstated seven years after resignation); In re Greenwood, 22 Wn. 2d 684, 157
P.2d 591 (1945) (disbarred four years); In re Lillions, 196 Wash. 272, 82 P.2d 571 (1938) (same); In re
Bruener, 178 Wash. 165, 34 P.2d 437 (1934) (same).
42. The supreme court decision is in accord with the Board's recommendation in favor of
reinstatement. Krogh, 93 Wn. 2d at 504, 610 P.2d at 1319.
43. Id. at 508, 610 P.2d at 1321.
44. Id. at 506, 610 P.2d at 1320. These mitigating circumstances included "[Krogh's] lack of
experience as a lawyer, his position of subordination to the President, and the 'frantic atmosphere' in the
White House at that time." Id.
45. In re Walgren, 104 Wn. 2d 557, 708 P.2d 380 (1985).
46. The court's decision was consistent with the Board's recommendation. The Board voted seven
to two to recommend reinstatement. Id. at 558, 708 P.2d at 381.
47. Id. at 568, 708 P.2d at 388.
48. Id. at 562, 708 P.2d at 383.
49. In re Rosellini, 108 Wn. 2d 350, 739 P.2d 658 (1987).
50. In re Rosellini, 97 Wn. 2d 373, 374, 646 P.2d 122, 123 (1982).
51. Id. at 376, 646 P.2d at 123.
52. When the client filed a complaint with the Bar Association indicating that these transactions
were occurring, Rosellini signed an affidavit with the Bar Association stating that he maintained his
trust account in accordance with Disciplinary Rule 9-102 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Id.
at 376, 646 P.2d at 124.
53. Rosellini filed a five million dollar lawsuit against the Seattle Post-Intelligencer (named
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investigation by the Washington State Bar Association, Rosellini was
disbarred on May 20, 1982, for mishandling trust funds.54 In 1986, he
applied for reinstatement. 55 The Board of Governors of the Bar Association
recommended against reinstatement.56 A crucial factor in the Board's
recommendation was the insufficient length of the disbarment period (three
years and nine months). 57 The supreme court ruled in favor of reinstatement
and discussed each of the Eddleman factors within the opinion.58
The following critique of the Eddleman factors and suggested proposals
for reform will focus upon the problems presented by these three cases.
II. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT APPROACH TO ATTORNEY
REINSTATEMENT
A. Present Standards Fail To Achieve Goals of Attorney Discipline
1. Public Protection
In pursuing the goal of public protection, the court is presented with a
clash between two competing interests. On the one hand, the disciplinary
process seeks to protect the public; on the other, it seeks to promote
rehabilitation of the individual petitioner. 9 In weighing these two interests,
the Washington Supreme Court's scale tips in favor of rehabilitation. 60
defendants were the Hearst Corporation and Seattle Post-Intelligencer reporters Tim Egan and Neil
Modie) on October 31, 1980. His suit accused the newspaper of libel, defamation and damages due to
"loss of reputation, humiliation and mental anguish." This lawsuit was filed shortly before an election
in which Rosellini was a candidate for Attorney General for the State of Washington. Broom, Rosellini
fights back, Seattle Times, Nov. 1, 1980, at A15, col. 2. The suit was dropped after Rosellini lost the
election. Jacobi, JohnRoselliniDropsHisSuitAgainstP-I, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Jan. 20, 1981, at
Al, col. 1.
54. Rosellini, 97 Wn. 2d at 374, 646 P.2d at 122.
55. Rosellini's petition for reinstatement was heard by the Washington Bar Association on
February 15, 1986. The petition subsequently was submitted to the supreme court on November 12,
1986. In re Rosellini, No. 4974 (Wash. filed Aug. 22, 1986).
56. In re Rosellini, 108 Wn. 2d 350, 351, 739 P.2d 658, 659 (1987); Answering Brief of
Washington State Bar Association app. A at 3, In re Rosellini, 108 Wn. 2d 350, 739 P.2d 658 (1987)
(No. 4974) (hereinafter WSBA Brief). The Board voted eight to one against reinstatement with one
governor abstaining.
57. See id. app. A at 2, Individual Comments of Ted Zylstra at 2, Individual Comments of Frank H.
Johnson at 2, Individual Comments of Jay V. White at 7.
58. Rosellini, 108 Wn. 2d 350, 739 P.2d 658.
59. Id. at 355, 739 P.2d at 660 ("The major consideration in reinstatement proceedings. . . is
whether the petitioner has overcome those weaknesses which produced his earlier misconduct."); see
also In re Johnson, 92 Wn. 2d 349, 350, 597 P.2d 113, 113 (1979).
60. In re Krogh, 93 Wn. 2d 504, 508,610 P.2d 1319, 1321 (1980) ("The law looks with favor upon
the reinstatement of former attorneys whose conduct and attitudes have been reformed.") (citing In re
Eddleman, 77 Wn. 2d 42, 44, 459 P.2d 387, 388 (1969)).
The emphasis on rehabilitation presents potential risks. The most dangerous one is the possibility of
729
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Although to date no reinstated lawyer has been disbarred a second time,
statistical results may be deceiving since the number of reinstated attorneys
is relatively small. 61 As the number of attorneys in Washington has in-
creased, 62 so have complaints against members of the profession. 63 Should
these figures continue to rise, the record for reinstated attorneys may not
remain unblemished.
2. Public Confidence in the Legal Profession
The goal of preserving confidence in the legal system has not fared well
under the present guidelines. The public's response to the Walgren64
decision and the Rosellini65 case reflects a diminished respect for the legal
system. The court's decisions in the Krogh, Walgren, and Rosellini cases
were inconsistent with judgments in prior reinstatement and admissions
cases. 66 Absent reasonable explanations for the court's inconsistent deci-
sions, the public has devised its own interpretations. Lenient decisions are
attributed to political favoritism. 67 The court's predisposition toward re-
habilitation at the risk of public protection is interpreted as weak self-
reinstating an attorney who commits another violation. However, the only absolute guarantee against
future abuses is permanent disbarment. This alternative exacts a heavy price from the individual
attorney in terms of the attorney's freedom to market and practice a profession which requires a large
educational investment. Most states traditionally have allowed a disbarred attorney to apply for
reinstatement. Annotation, Reinstatement of Attorney afterDisbarment, Suspension or Resignation, 70
A.L.R. 2d 268, 277 (1960). The body of Washington law supports the position allowing reinstatement.
Rosellini, 108 Wn. 2d at 364, 739 P.2d at 665.
61. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
62. In 1966, there were 3,849 lawyers in Washington. The total rose to 11,901 in 1986. This is an
increase of over 300% during the past 20 years. Telephone conversation with Robert T. Farrell, State bar
counsel, Washington State Bar Ass'n (Mar. 12, 1987).
63. The number of complaints per lawyer received by the Washington State Bar Association
increased by 36% between 1981 and 1986. The number of complaints in 1981 was 982 (10.8 complaints
per 100 active in-state lawyers). The number received in 1986 was approximately 1748 (14.7 complaints
per 100 active in-state lawyers). Statistics compiled by the Washington State Bar Ass'n (copy on file
with the Washington Law Review). Nationally, complaints in 35 states rose 37.6% from 1984 to 1985.
ABA Survey of Lawyer Discipline System (1986).
64. See infra notes 67, 70.
65. See infra notes 68, 70.
66. See infra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
67. See Walgren gets VIP treatment from the bar, Seattle Times, Dec. 28, 1984, at A7, col. I
("Why the special treatment for a convicted felon? Because Gordon Walgren has friends in high places,
that's why."); Astonishing decision in Walgren case, Seattle Times, Oct. 19, 1985, at A13, col.l:
Because of Walgren's prominence as a political figure, [his reinstatement] also raises questions
about the consistency of standards applied to lawyers denied the right to practice because of
wrongdoing. The court has been tougher on lesser-known attorneys and Walgren himself says he
thinks his reputation as a legislative leader helped his case with the high bench.
Id.
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regulation of the legal system. 68 The court's response is that public opinion
is not an appropriate factor in deciding individual cases. 69 This response,
however, overlooks the fact that public opinion is an important reflection of
the court's success in preserving public confidence in the legal system. 70 A
perception of impropriety may significantly damage this confidence. 71 The
perception of impropriety is especially harmful when attorneys in positions
of public trust and authority are involved.
B. Present Standards Lack Uniform Application
The court has not applied present standards uniformly. This problem is
rooted in the vagueness of the Eddleman factors. These factors are simply a
list of elements which do not establish minimum performance standards for
reinstatement. They are descriptive, not prescriptive, and do not set limits
on judicial discretion. Often the court selects certain Eddleman factors to
justify its decisions while minimizing or ignoring others.72
68. See Like Walgren, Rosellini proved himself unworthy, Seattle Times, Mar. 14, 1986, at A9,
col.l:
I was angered when the Washington State Bar Association recommended and the state Supreme
Court allowed Gordon Walgren to practice law again. Now the bar is considering allowing John
Rosellini back into the association and I am even more angry.. . . To consider either Walgren or
Rosellini fit to be a part of the bar is a travesty tojustice. . . This is a question, and a test, of the
ethics and morals of the Washington State Bar Association and the entire legal profession. We
should not let time dilute the gravity of their actions or allow misplaced sympathies to guide this
decision.
Id.
69. Justice Dolliver believes that public opinion should not play a role in individual cases.
However, he states that public opinion is reflected through the briefs presented to the court and thus has
an impact in creating the atmosphere under which the court functions. Interview with James Dolliver,
Justice of the Washington Supreme Court, in Olympia, Washington (Mar. 2, 1987).
70. See Bar feels its reputation is at stake in Rosellini case, Seattle Times/Seattle Post-Intel-
ligencer, Feb. 16, 1986, at Dl, col. 1 ("State bar association officials indicated yesterday that they are
worried about their organization's reputation if they allow attorney John Rosellini to practice law
again."); Walgren case could weaken public's trust of lawyers, Seattle Times, Aug. 9, 1981, at A14,
col.l. ("[T]he public's perception of and confidence in the legal system [are] key issue[s] for
consideration in weighing the conduct of lawyers. Especially those who, like Walgren, have risen to
positions of political power and public trust.").
71. In re Goldman, 179 Mont. 526, 588 P.2d 964 (1978), held that the court could not expect the
public to comply voluntarily with the legal system if officers of the court were allowed to break the law.
"Unless we keep clean our own house-. . . we cannot expect the public to have confidence in the
integrity of the bar and our system of justice." 588 P.2d at 985.
72. Justice Dolliver explained this selective application of the elements to individual cases by
noting that:
[I]n many of the cases some of [the Eddleman factors] are easily disposed of; some of them may not
apply. Generally there are three of four of the Eddleman points which are absolutely crucial to the
case. Either there is no particular issue on the other points or no one wants to argue them, so they
are dismissed.
Interview with James Dolliver, Justice of the Washington Supreme Court, in Olympia, Washington
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The major weakness of the Eddleman factors originates from the failure
to establish minimum time periods before reinstatement. This weakness is
highlighted by the application of the Eddleman factors in the Walgren and
Krogh cases. In both Krogh and Walgren, the court brushed over the length-
of-time-since-disbarment criterion. Prior to Krogh, the average period of
disbarment was seven and one-half years. The supreme court granted
reinstatement to Krogh after only five years73 and to Walgren just three
years from the time he was disbarred. 74 Although the court is not required
to abide by previous disbarment terms, its departure from precedent
underscores the problem with the lack of fixed criteria established by the
Eddleman factors. Prior to Rosellini, out of the number of disbarments in
Washington involving misuse of client trust funds, only four lawyers have
been reinstated. The average period of disbarment for these offenses was
eight years. 75 At the time the supreme court heard his petition, Rosellini
had been disbarred for four years and five months. Even if all the other
Eddleman factors were satisfied, prior to the Krogh and Walgren decisions
the disbarment time factor alone probably would have resulted in a denial of
Rosellini's petition.
The Walgren decision opened the door to further inconsistent applications
of the Eddleman factors. At the time the decision was rendered, Walgren was
still on parole. 76 In the past, the court required that a petitioner complete
parole to establish rehabilitation before applying for reinstatement. 77 In
addition, the court disregarded Walgren's failure to show remorse for his
(Mar. 2, 1987). Although, in Rosellini the court appeared to recognize this problem and carefully
addressed all Eddleman factors individually. In re Rosellini 108 Wn. 2d 350, 739 P.2d 658 (1987).
73. In re Krogh, 93 Wn. 2d 504, 610 P.2d 1319 (1980). Krogh was disbarred in 1975 and granted
reinstatement in May 1980 subject to his completion of the bar exam. A number of mitigating factors
were mentioned to justify this decision. The court cited Krogh's "lack of experience as a lawyer, his
position of subordination to the President, and the 'frantic atmosphere' in the White House at that
time." Id. at 506, 610 P.2d at 1320.
74. In re Walgren, 104 Wn. 2d at 558, 708 P.2d at 380 (Walgren was disbarred in June 1982 and
granted reinstatement in October 1985 subject to completion of parole and passing of the bar exam).
The Walgren opinion also illustrates a problem regarding the calculation of disbarment periods.
Presently these dates may be manipulated to lend support to an argument for or against reinstatement of
an individual. In some cases the court calculates the relevant time period from the date an attorney is
suspended from practice. See id. at 566,708 P.2d at 385. In other situations, the court starts the clock at
the official date of disbarment although the lawyer's practice effectively ended before that date. In re
Seijas, 63 Wn. 2d 865, 866, 389 P.2d 652,653 (1964) (Seijas was sentenced for tax evasion in 1955 and
officially disbarred in 1957). To reduce confusion and provide consistency, one of these dates (time of
sentencing or disbarment) should be designated as the starting point for measuring removal from
practice. When the date is selected all future opinions should calculate their terms accordingly.
75. In re Batali, 98 Wn. 2d 610, 657 P.2d 775 (1983) (eight years); In re Johnson, 92 Wn. 2d 349,
597 P.2d 113 (1979) (I1 years); In re Chantry, 84 Wn. 2d 153, 524 P.2d 909 (1974) (nine years); In re
Lillions, 196 Wash. 272, 82 P.2d 571 (1938) (four years).
76. Walgren, 104 Wn. 2d at 571, 708 P.2d at 388.




crime.78 Prior to Walgren, if a petitioner committed an illegal act the court
demanded a measure of repentance.79 The effect of these inconsistencies was
apparent in Rosellini. A decision denying reinstatement to Rosellini would
have been difficult to justify when compared to the facts in Walgren.80 In
deference to these contrasting cases, the court chose a middle road and
granted reinstatement contingent upon the successful completion of aproba-
tion period. 81
C. Present Standards Fail To Satisfy Other Reinstatement
Considerations
1. Integrity of the Legal Profession
The court's present reinstatement standards fail to maintain the integrity
of the legal profession in that the standards allow for the reinstatement of
attorneys who arguably are not fit to practice. This situation is illustrated by
the court's employment of a double standard whereby requirements for
reentry to the bar are more lenient than admission standards. 82 Differing
applications of the "good moral character" requirement contained in the
Admission to Practice Rules are at the root of this double standard. 83
78. Walgren, 104 Wn. 2d at 563, 708 P.2d at 384.
79. See, e.g., In re Simmons, 71 Wn. 2d 316, 321, 428 P.2d 582 585 (1967) ("IT]he evidence
presented by . . . [Simmons] . . . falls short of a positive showing that he truly recognized the
disservice which his conduct did to the legal profession.")
80. Although Rosellini's and Walgren's transgressions are distinguishable on several bases, they do
not support a significant difference in disbarment periods. Rosellini's violations involved the perfor-
mance of his duties as an attorney and Walgren's involved his actions as a public official. Walgren was
convicted of a crime and Rosellini's offense did not result in a conviction. Finally, Rosellini has shown
evidence of rehabilitation and was not on parole at the time of his petition. In contrast, Walgren was on
parole at the time of his petition and maintains his innocence. See generally In re Rosellini, 108 Wn. 2d
350, 739 P.2d 658 (1987); Walgren, 104 Wn. 2d 557, 708 P.2d 380.
81. Given the renewed public outcry reinstatement might provoke, the court tempered the impact
with a stipulation that Rosellini practice in a probationary capacity under the supervision of another
lawyer. This proposal was suggested by the petitioner. Brief of Petitioner at 54, In re Rosellini, No.
4974 (Wash. filed Aug. 22, 1986). The state disciplinary rules stipulate a maximum two year
probationary period. Rule of Lawyer Discipline 5.2(a). However, the court waived this rule and
imposed a three year period. Rosellini agreed to this longer period and the bar association did not raise
any objections. Rosellini, 108 Wn. 2d at 361, 739 P.2d at 663.
82. Justice Dolliver reconciles this difference by distinguishing prospective new attorneys from
veteran attorneys on two grounds. First, a disbarred lawyer has a prior performance record for the court
to review. This type of information is not available from initial applicants. Second, Justice Dolliver
states that many of the controversial admission cases involved cumulative offenses, in contrast to the
reinstatement cases which involved single incidents. Interview with James Dolliver, Justice of the
Washington Supreme Court, in Olympia, Washington (Mar. 2, 1987).
83. Admission to Practice Rule 3. These admission requirements state that an applicant must fulfill
educational requirements, pass the bar exam and establish good moral character. Reinstatement
applicants also are required to meet these standards. RLD Rule 9.6(a).
733
Washington Law Review
Traditionally, the Washington Supreme Court defines "good moral
character" as an absence of "moral turpitude." "Moral turpitude" is
described as conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good mor-
als. 84 Such conduct includes acts which cause doubts about a person's
honesty, fairness, and respect for the rights of others and for the law.85 In
applying the definition of moral turpitude to initial admission cases, the
Washington Supreme Court hfs refused to admit applicants who had
written a bad check, 86 murdered a person, 87 and placed a bomb in a car.88
The most highly publicized of these cases, In re Wright, 89 involved a law
student who was convicted of second degree murder and drug possession.
Potentially mitigating circumstances surrounded these charges. 90 Follow-
ing the completion of a prison sentence, Wright overcame difficult odds by
returning to school and obtaining his law degree. More than eleven years
after committing these crimes he applied for admission to the bar. 91 The
supreme court denied his petition based upon his lack of good moral
character. 92 Four justices strongly dissented, pointing out that although
Wright's offenses were serious other factors warranted his admission. The
offenses were committed many years prior to the time he requested admis-
sion to the bar. They involved mitigating circumstances. They did not
include violations of his duties as a lawyer and Wright willingly acknowl-
edged his guilt. 93
A comparison of the facts in Wright to those in Walgren highlights the
double standard. In Walgren the court granted reinstatement despite the fact
that the petitioner was disbarred for only three years at the time of his
application, 94 was still on parole95 and showed no remorse for his
crime.96 Certainly, Walgren's illegal activities cast doubts upon Walgren's
84. In re Hopkins, 54 Wash. 569, 572, 103 P. 805, 806 (1909).
85. In re Wright, 102 Wn. 2d 855, 858, 690 P.2d 1134, 1136 (1984).
86. Unreported case of Madison King. See Seattle Times, Apr. 14, 1985, at Al, col. 2.
87. See In re Wright, 102 Wn. 2d 855, 690 P.2d 1134 (1984).
88. In re Belsher, 102 Wn. 2d 844, 689 P.2d 1078 (1984).
89. Wright, 102 Wn. 2d 855, 690 P.2d 1134.
90. Wright claims he acted in self defense in shooting his girlfriend's husband. Id. at 863,690 P.2d
at 1138. He also explains that the drugs he was convicted of possessing were concealed in a birthday gift.
To avoid being labeled a "snitch" if his murder conviction required a jail sentence, he pled guilty to
drug posession. Id. at 865, 690 P.2d at 1139.
91. The Board of Governors voted in favor of his admission, finding that his behavior following his
crimes was exemplary. Id. at 862, 690 P.2d at 1138.
92. Id. at 860, 690 P.2d at 1137.
93. Id. at 869-70, 690 P.2d at 1141-42.
94. In re Walgren, 104 Wn. 2d 557, 708 P.2d 380 (1985).
95. Walgren, 104 Wn. 2d 557, 574, 708 P.2d 380, 390 (The court was unable to locate any other
case in the nation which had granted reinstatement to a petitioner on parole at the time of the application
review.)
96. Walgren, 104 Wn. 2d at 562, 708 P.2d at 383. This fact underscores the distinctions between
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honesty, fairness and respect for the rights of others and for the law. These
doubts were reflected in the court's decision to disbar him. The question
raised by this comparison is whether an initial applicant, in Walgren's
situation, would be considered for entry to the bar? The answer appears to
be "no." If the court denied entry to an applicant who had exhibited eleven
years of good behavior since his offense, certainly it would not admit a
person who was still on parole and refused to show any remorse for the
crime of which he was convicted. Yet the court did allow Walgren's
reinstatement. Although the court does have the power to set its standards at
any level, the court rules and basic principles of fairness require that these
applicants be evaluated on an equal basis.
2. Fairness to the Individual Applicant
Present reinstatement standards are not fair to individual petitioners.
Although the court attempts to be fair by evaluating each case individu-
ally,97 the resulting decisions provide very vague and uncertain guidelines
to potential applicants. In evaluating the probability of reinstatement,
petitioners are confronted with a line of cases producing unpredictable
disbarment periods98 and inconsistent applications of the Eddleman fac-
tors.99 These decisions fail to furnish disbarred attorneys with guidance
about the performance standards required to establish eligibility for re-
instatement and do not indicate the appropriate time for filing petitions in
individual cases. This situation encourages multiple attempts for reinstate-
ment and results in wasted time and resources for both the petitioners and
the court.
reinstatement and initial admissions decisions. The court has held that in considering a reinstatement
petition, the court must treat the petitioner's guilt as an established fact. In re Lonergan, 23 Wn. 2d 767,
771, 162 P.2d 289, 291 (1945). In both reinstatement and initial admissions cases, the court has required
remorse for an offense to demonstrate rehabilitation. See, e.g., In re Wright, 102 Wn. 2d 855, 870,690
P.2d 1134, 1142 (1984); In re Simmons, 71 Wn. 2d 317, 319, 428 P.2d 582, 585 (1967). Although the
court should have treated Walgren's guilt as established fact based upon this principle and required
remorse, the court did not compel Walgren to conform to this requirement and expressed confusion
about his conviction. Walgren, 104 Wn. 2d at 562, 568, 708 P.2d at 383, 386. Admittedly this
requirement presents problems for the court. See infra note 116. However, fairness demands that if the
court is willing to disregard this element in reinstatement cases, the same benefit should be extended to
admission cases.
97. In re Rosellini, 108 Wn. 2d 350, 359, 739 P.2d 658, 663 (1987).
98. Simmons applied and was rejected after three years. He eventually was reinstated after eight
years. In re Simmons 81 Wn. 2d 43,499 P.2d 874 (1972);In re Simmons, 71Wn. 2d 316,428 P.2d 582
(1967). Eddleman applied and was rejected after five years. His reinstatement petition was granted after
seven years. In re Eddleman, 79 Wn. 2d 725,489 P.2d 174 (1971); In re Eddleman, 77 Wn. 2d 42, 459
P.2d 387 (1969). Seijas applied and was denied reinstatement after seven years. His petition was granted
after 12 years. In re Seijas, 75 Wn. 2d 956,454 P.2d 203 (1969); In re Seijas, 63 Wn. 2d 865, 389 P.2d
652 (1964).
99. See supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
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In re Rosellini illustrates the problem created by the lack of clear
guidelines. Although Rosellini undoubtedly was pleased with the court's
decision, the result was not a predictable one. First, in previous cases the
court often weighed the relative seriousness of crimes in different manners.
For example, in one situation an IRS violation warranted disbarment for 12
years, 100 while in another case a federal racketeering conviction resulted in
the granting of reinstatement after only three years. 101 Second, Rosellini
only could have guessed at the appropriate time to apply for reinstatement.
In earlier opinions the court emphasized the gravity of a trust fund violation
and denied reinstatement for an average of eight years.10 2 Rosellini's
reinstatement after five years, therefore, could not have been predicted in
advance with any degree of accuracy. The third problem confronting
Rosellini was how the court would interpret the Eddleman factor regarding
the ethical practices he had observed in his law practice. Prior to Rosellini,
the court and the Board wavered over whether to consider the misconduct
leading to disbarment when evaluating a petitioner's legal ethics. The court
resolved future confusion about this factor by explicitly excluding informa-
tion regarding the misconduct. 103 However, the Board included the miscon-
duct in evaluating this factor, adding to Rosellini's difficulties in predicting
the outcome of his petition. All of these inconsistencies are problems
which make the reinstatement process more difficult, confusing and ulti-
mately less fair than a set of clear, explicit standards.
III. NEW DIRECTIONS FOR ATTORNEY REINSTATEMENT
A. Proposed Changes
The problems with the current reinstatement standards could be resolved
by the development of more structured sets of disbarment and reinstate-
ment guidelines. These guidelines would minimize the potentially exces-
sive use of judicial discretion and eliminate petitioner speculation regard-
ing the appropriate time to submit an application. Confusion over the
requirements for reinstatement may be reduced by revising the remaining
Eddleman factors and eliminating those that do not further the disciplinary
goals. The revised factors would serve as objective criteria for the petitioner
to fulfill during the disbarment period.
100. In re Seijas, 75 Wn. 2d 956,454 P.2d 203 (1969). Seijas's earlier attempt at reinstatement was
rejected. In re Seijas, 63 Wn. 2d 865, 389 P.2d 652 (1964) (reinstatement refused after seven years).
101. Walgren, 104 Wn. 2d 855, 690 P.2d 1134 (1984).
102. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
103. In re Rosellini, 108 Wn. 2d 350, 356,739 P.2d 658,661 (1987). The clarification of this factor
is one instance where the court has assisted future reinstatement petitioners by eliminating confusion or




1. Uniform Disbarment Guidelines for Specific Offenses
The establishment of uniform disbarment time periods for various types
of offenses would provide the certainty lacking in the present system. 104
The court could adopt the classifications of offenses proposed in the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions to gauge the gravity of ethical
violations. 105 Although these classifications were devised to provide the
states with general assistance in imposing discipline, application of the
ABA classifications also can be extended to the reinstatement situation.
The ABA classifications include violations of duties falling into four
general categories. These are, in order of severity, duties owed to clients, 106
to the public, 10 7 to the legal system, 10 8 and to the legal profession. 0 9 In
determining disbarment periods, the severity of the individual offenses
within these categories could be measured according to several factors set
forth in the ABA proposal. 110 The ABA proposal indicates that the most
104. Justice Dolliver objects to restricting judicial discretion in the reinstatement area and believes
that the court should hold a "fairly fluid stance." Interview with James Dolliver, Justice of the
Washington Supreme Court, Olympia, Washington (Mar. 2, 1987).
105. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAwYER SANCTIONS (Approved Draft 1986). These standards
furnish guidelines for state courts to use in establishing uniformity in discipline cases. The ABA's goal
in issuing these recommendations was to increase the effectiveness of the disciplinary system through
clearly developed standards. Id. at I.A. The purpose is similar to that of mandatory sentencing
guidelines used in criminal cases. See infra note 113.
These standards are a step forward in dealing with the problem of attorney discipline. However, they
do not thoroughly address the issue of reinstatement. The only significant recommendation relating to
reinstatement advocates increasing the mandatory period of disbarment from three to five years.
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCrIONs Rule 2.10 commentary (Approved Draft 1986). See supra
note 16.
A preliminary step before-revising the reinstatement standards may be to adopt this ABA proposal in
its entirety. Although Washington has not officially adopted these guidelines, the Washington Supreme
Court appears to be considering them. See ABA Offers Uniform Standards for Imposing Sanctions,
Nat'l L.J., Oct. 27, 1986, at 32, col. I (adoption of the proposed ABA sanctions standards ii
Washington State would be immensely helpful according to Dolliver, J.). The court also has employed
the guidelines in a recent disciplinary decision. In re Rentel, 107 Wn. 2d 276, 729 P.2d 615 (1986).
106. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCnONs Rule 4.0 (Approved Draft 1986). Violations
include failure to preserve client property, failure to preserve client confidences, failure to avoid
conflicts of interest, lack of diligence, lack of competence, and lack of candor.
107. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAwYER SANcrioNs Rule 5.0 (Approved Draft 1986). Violations
include failure to maintain personal integrity and failure to maintain the public trust.
108. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Rule 6.0 (Approved Draft 1986). Violations
include false statements, fraud, misrepresentation, abuse of the legal process, and improper communi-
cations with individuals in the legal system.
109. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCnONS Rule 7.0 (Approved Draft 1986). Violations
include false or misleading communications about the lawyer or the lawyer's services, improper
solicitation, unreasonable or improper fees, unauthorized practice of law, improper withdrawal from
representation and failure to report professional misconduct.
110. The four factors suggested by the ABA proposal are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental
state, the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating
or mitigating factors. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANcrIONS Rule 3.0 (Approved Draft 1986).
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serious offenses within each category are those which involve knowing
violations of ethical duties to clients resulting in potentially serious injury,
absent mitigating circumstances. 11 The least serious are those caused by
mistakes, involving mitigating circumstances, or resulting in minor inju-
ries to people other than clients. ' 1 2
Standard disbarment ranges may be developed and applied by the court
in a manner similar to the method provided in the Washington Criminal
Sentencing Reform Act, which seeks to assign punishment in proportion to
the crime. 113 The element of punishment inherent in the attorney disciplin-
ary process facilitates this comparison." 4 The supreme court, with the
111. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Rule 4.1 (Approved Draft 1986).
112. See generally STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Rule 9.3 (Approved Draft 1986).
113. Washington Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, WASH. REv. CODE § 9.94A.010 (1981). The Act
is designed to make the criminal justice system accountable by developing a system which assigns
punishment in proportion to the crime, to encourage respect for the law, to encourage consistency in
court decisions and to protect the public. Id. The criminal offenses are divided into fourteen levels of
seriousness. The severity of the offense is added to information regarding the offender's past criminal
record. The resulting score indicates the appropriate punishment. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.
However, attorney disbarment periods cannot be as narrowly defined as criminal sentencing periods
due to the nature of the offenses. Attorney offenses do not fall into categories as easily as criminal acts.
With attorney violations it also is difficult to anticipate every situation and designate disbarment periods
for the wide range of offenses which might occur. Finally, in criminal sentencing release is mandatory at
the end of the sentencing period. In contrast, a disbarred attorney is not automatically reinstated at the
end of the disbarment period. As a result, the procedure applied in the criminal context may not be
applied in all aspects and a significant element of judicial discretion will necessarily remain.
114. Application of the criminal sentencing framework is appropriate because of the nature of
disciplinary sanctions. Lawyer discipline can be considered a method of punishment and has been
interpreted by some courts as "quasi-criminal" in nature. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968); In re
Little, 40 Wn. 2d 421,430, 244 P.2d 255, 259 (1952). In fact, it is difficult to discuss disbarment and
reinstatement without including the objective of punishment, although the Washington Supreme Court
denies this objective. In re Greenwood, 22 Wn. 2d 684, 689, 157 P.2d 591, 593 (1945); see also In re
Noble, 100 Wn. 2d 88, 95,667 P.2d 608,612 (1983) (discipline is not punishment; the primary concern
is protecting the public and deterring other lawyers). In spite of these statements, the court appears to
contradict itself with references to punishment in the Eddleman factors and in individual opinions. In re
Walgren, 104 Wn. 2d 557, 572, 708 P.2d 380, 388 (1985); In re Krogh, 93 Wn. 2d 504, 507, 610 P.2d
1319, 1320 (1980). Although Justice Dolliver believes that punishment is an element which should be
acknowledged, he indicates that the contradictory statements may be the result of conflicting views
within the court. Interview with James Dolliver, Justice of the Washington Supreme Court, in Olympia,
Washington (Mar. 2, 1987).
The objective of punishment may be more acceptable to the other members of the court if it is
explained in terms of reprobation rather than retribution. Although the result may be the same, the
motivations behind the two goals are very different. Retribution reflects a desire for revenge or
retaliation. See W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 25-26 (1986). Reprobation looks to the future
and discourages potential offenders by identifying those acts which society deems unacceptable. See C.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics 81-82 (1986).
An example of the use of punishment to achieve reprobation may be found in the trust fund violation
situations. The court consistently has designated the misuse of client's funds as the worst offense
against the profession by an attorney. The nearly automatic response to this act is disbarment of the
offending attorney. In re Rosellini, 97 Wn. 2d 373, 377, 646 P.2d 122, 124 (1982). Through this
response, the court sends a message to lawyers and the public that the legal profession will not tolerate
738
Attorney Reinstatement Standards
possible assistance of an advisory committee, could make the specific
determination of the time period for each offense.
Although the court rejects the utilization of "statistical averages," 115
consideration of this information is inevitable in maintaining a line of
consistent decisions for petitioners and the public to consult for guidance.
The members of the court and the Board change over time. The criteria and
the standards for reinstatement should not shift accordingly. Through the
implementation of more narrowly defined disbarment periods, the court
would prevent these fluctuations.
2. Revised Criteria for Reinstatement
Under this proposed system, the court would discontinue consideration
of five Eddleman factors. The remaining Eddleman factors would be
revised to take into account additional relevant information as follows: (1)
demonstration by petitioner of knowledge that the incident leading to
disbarment was improper lawyer conduct;1 16 (2) demonstration that the
petitioner successfully handled responsible positions during the disbar-
ment period; 117 (3) restitution of all property improperly taken by the
lawyer; 118 (4) proof of completion of all jail sentences and parole peri-
ods; 119 and (5) demonstration of current proficiency in the law. 120 Lawyers
who fail to measure up to these minimum standards would not be reins-
tated. However, they would have the right to reapply in the future. '2 '
this kind of activity by its members and reaffirms the actions of those lawyers obeying the profession's
ethical code. Dissemination of this information achieves the goals of deterring inappropriate conduct
and increasing public confidence in the legal system.
115. Rosellini, 108 Wn. 2d at 360, 739 P.2d at 663.
116. The goal of this requirement is to demonstrate the integrity and reformation of the attorney.
The method of demonstration would vary for different offenses. Generally, petitioners would be
required to acknowledge the wrongfulness of the offenses for which they were disbarred. No admission
of guilt would be required because of the conflict presented to lawyers who maintain their innocence. A
rule requiring admission of guilt may force attorneys to admit to perjury at a prior proceeding or admit
guilt when in fact they do not believe that they are guilty. This result would be counterproductive to the
goal of the requirement if attorneys are forced to compromise their principles to restore their status in
the profession. See Walgren, 104 Wn. 2d at 563, 708 P.2d at 384; In re Eddleman, 77 Wn. 2d 43, 45,
459 P.2d 387, 389 (1969).
117. This requirement is an extension of the requirement that a petitioner establish a "new
reputation" during the disbarment period to demonstrate rehabilitation. Walgren, 104 Wn. 2d at 567,
708 P.2d at 386; Lonergan, 23 Wn. 2d at 771, 162 P.2d at 291.
118. The court consistently has required restitution where applicable. See In re Batali, 98 Wn. 2d
610,619,657 P.2d 775,780 (1983);In re Johnson, 92 Wn. 2d 349,351,597 P.2d 113,114 (1979);In re
Chantry, 84 Wn. 2d 153, 154, 524 P.2d 909, 910 (1974); In re Lillions, 196 Wash. 272, 279, 82 P.2d
571, 574 (1938).
119. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
120. In re Bowden, 99 Wn. 2d 684, 689, 633 P.2d 1349, 1351 (1983).
121. See supra note 16.
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Mandatory periods of disbarment for specific categories of ethical
breaches would eliminate the need to consider the charge leading to
disbarment, the sufficiency of the punishment, and the time that has
elapsed since disbarment. Completion of the disbarment period would
establish a presumption that these factors had been adequately addressed.
Two other Eddleman factors would be dropped: standing in the community
prior to disbarment, and the petitioner's ethical standards prior to disbar-
ment. These factors neither establish rehabilitation during the disbarment
period, 122 nor are they relevant to the appropriate degree of discipline since
they relate to the attorney's conduct prior to the offense. In addition,
consideration of these factors encourages the uneven application of the law
to individual offenders.
B. Benefits of Proposed Changes
A uniform approach to disbarment and reinstatement would diminish the
current problems with the attorney reinstatement process and assist the
court in achieving the goals of lawyer discipline. First, standard disbarment
periods would promote public protection by disbarring offenders for a
length of time which the court has determined is sufficient to allow for the
demonstration of rehabilitation. The standard disbarment periods also
would deter potential violators by guaranteeing certain punishment. Sec-
ond, the proposed approach would preserve and increase public confidence
in the legal system by reducing inconsistencies in sentencing and providing
explicit guidelines to explain decisions. Third, the system would be fairer to
petitioners. It notifies them of the penalties for transgressions before they
commit ethical breaches and informs them when to reapply to the bar,
reducing the wasted effort of repeated applications. The system also
establishes a performance standard for the petitioner to achieve during the
disbarment period. Finally, this system would solve problems of unpredic-
table sentences and inconsistent decisions in the current reinstatement
process.
C. Application to Rosellini Case
Under the proposed approach, Rosellini should have applied for re-
instatement only after completing the mandatory disbarment period desig-
nated for his specific ethical breach. 123 Assuming that Rosellini applied at
122. Although the court has not narrowed its scope to the disbarment period, the logical assump-
tion is that the court's emphasis on rehabilitation would require the focus of attention on the petitioner's
activities during this period. Interview with James Dolliver, Justice of the Washington Supreme Court,
in Olympia, Washington (Mar. 2, 1987).




the appropriate time, he would move on to the next step; consideration
under the revised Eddleman factors. First, he would have to prove himself
worthy of reinstatement by passing a test examining his knowledge of the
rules of professional conduct, specifically those applicable to the manage-
ment of trust funds. 124 Second, he would have to provide recommendations
vouching for his ability to hold responsible positions. 125 Third, he would
have to make full restitution to his former clients. 126 Finally, he would have
to retake and pass the bar examination to demonstrate his current profi-
ciency in the law. 127 Since no jail sentence was imposed on Rosellini, the
factor relating to the completion of jail and parole does not apply.
The decision applying the proposed system would hinge upon the length
of the disbarment period because Rosellini would qualify under the revised
set of Eddleman factors. If the court had relied upon the disbarment time
periods imposed in other similar cases, Rosellini would not have been
reinstated.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current common law standards for attorney reinstatement in Wash-
ington State are flawed. They fail to promote the goals of the disciplinary
process and diminish the integrity of the legal profession. In addition, the
standards do not provide sufficient guidance to attorneys regarding the
court's expectations regarding the qualifications for reinstatement. Finally,
the resulting decisions lack uniformity.
These problems call for the implementation of a new approach to
attorney reinstatement. As the number of lawyers in Washington continues
to grow and the number of discipline cases increases, the court is likely to
address the issue of reinstatement more frequently. The need for a new
system thus will become more pressing.
The supreme court took advantage of the Rosellini case to explain its
position on reinstatement. Although the decision perpetuates many of the
violation to be one of the most serious. See supra text accompanying notes 106-10. The average period
of disbarment for past cases of trust fund violations was eight years.
Although the court unanimously voted in favor of Rosellini's reinstatement, several judges voiced
concern over the three year minimum disbarment period. Rosellini, 108 Wn. 2d at 365, 739 P.2d at
665-66 (Callow, L, Anderson, J. & Noe, L Pro tem., concurring). The recommendation of the Board of
Governors also reflects this concern. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
124. The test would cover the Washington Rules of Professional Conduct, with special emphasis on
trust fund responsibilities.
125. Ideally, this recommendation would involve the responsible handling of other persons'
money. Rosellini provided such recommendations. Rosellini, 108 Wn. 2d at 356, 739 P.2d at 661.
126. Rosellini reimbursed all debts to his clients prior to his application for reinstatement. WSBA
Brief, supra note 56, at 6-7.
127. At the time of the supreme court hearing, Rosellini had not retaken the bar examination. See
generally, Rosellini, 108 Wn. 2d 350, 739 P.2d 658.
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potential problems with judicial discretion, the thoroughness of the opinion
signals a concern for explaining the court's reasoning to attorneys, the
Board and the public. The challenge now is for the court to maintain
consistency among its opinions. Adoption of the revised guidelines sug-
gested in this Comment would serve this goal and establish a strong
foundation for future reinstatement decisions.
Anne Badgley
742
Vol 62:723, 1987
